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The Effect of Diffusion and Concentration of 
Responsibility on the Risky Shift Phenomenon 
m a Two-choice Situation 
GENE F. SMITH and THOMAS L. RADINSKY 1 
Abstract. The role of diffusion of responsibility in the production of 
the risky shift phenomenon was examined in a two-choice situation. Ex-
pected value of the two choices was held constant by varying payoffs in-
versely with their probabilities. After 100 trials alone, subjects were put 
into one of three conditions for the next 100 trials: Control Condition, 
Group Diffusion of Responsibility Condition or Group Concentration of 
Responsibility Condition. No significant shifts were found in any of these 
conditions. The Kogan and Wallach perdiction that diffusion of respons-
ibility would lead to a greater risky shift was not supported. The results 
were consistent with Zajonc, \Volosin, Wolosin, and Sherman's contention 
that the utility of being correct produced a conservative shift in the group 
condition of their experiment. The findings of the present experiment im-
ply that the risky shift phenomenon may not occur under all diffusion of 
rf'sponsibility conditions. 
The risky shift phenomenon refers to the increased level of 
risk taking which has been found to occur as the result of a group 
discussion. Conversely, one would refer to a shift away from risk 
as a conservative shift. The instrument for measuring risk taking 
in most of the studies in which the risky shift phenomenon has 
been found is the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire. In this ques-
tionaire, which was first used by Wallach and Kogan ( 1959), each 
item describes a situation in which a hypothetical person must 
decide between a risky but attractive course of action and a more 
certain but less attractive alternative. The subject is asked to specify 
the mimimum probability of success he would demand before ad-
vising the hypothetical person to attempt the risky alternative. 
Each subject completes the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire twice. 
The first time provides a measure of his initial risk taking level 
and the second time is typically after a group discussion. In gen-
eral the decisions following group discussions are riskier than the 
mean of the individual decisions. 
One explanation of the risky shift phenomenon was proposed 
by Kogan and Wallach (Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wallach, Kogan 
& Bern, 1962). According to the diffusion of responsibility hypoth-
esis, members of groups should be inclined to support riskier deci-
sions than individuals because the responsibility for potential failure 
is spread among the group members. Diffusion of responsibility is 
thought to weaken group members' concern with the negative 
aspects of the risky decision, thus enhancing its attractiveness. If 
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the hypothesis is correct, responsibility should diffuse more readily 
in larger compared to smaller groups, in cohesive groups and in 
groups of anxious people, thus yielding greater risky shifts in these 
groups. Some evidence supporting these predictions has been found 
(Kogan & Wallach, 1967: Wallach & Kogan, 1965: Wallach, 
Kogan, & Bern. 1964) . 
While the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis assumes that 
the risky shift is a general consequence of making choices in a 
group, some evidence indicates that the conservative shift can 
also occur. \Vhile most of the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire items 
tend to elicit a risky shift, a few of the items do elicit a consistent 
conservative shift (Myers, 1967). Why this should be is left un-
explained by the diffusion off responsibility hypothesis. In addition 
to the fact that some items of the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire 
elicit conservative shifts, Zajonc, Wolosin, \Volosin. and Sherman 
(] 968) have reported a consen·atiw shift in a two-choice situa-
tion. Unlike the situation with the Choice Dilemmas questionaire. 
in the Zajonc ct al. study individuals made choices which had 
direct and immediate consequences for themselves. The subject's 
task was to predict which of two lights would occur on each of a 
large number of trials. One light. if predicted correctly, yielded a 
high payoff (1 Y2 cents), while the other light yielded a low ( 1 
cent) payoff when correctly prPdicted. The high payoff choice was 
correct on .6 of the tials, while the low payoff choice was correct 
on .4 of the trials. Thus on each trial an individual had to choose 
between a choice with a high payoff hut a low probability of suc-
cess, and one with a lower payoff but a higher probability of suc-
cess. The payoffs and their probabilities of occurrence were ar-
ranged so that the expected value of the two choices was equal. 
After a number of trials during which individuals worked alone. 
two conditions were formed. In one condition three individuals 
were brought together and required to reach a consensus decision 
on each trial. In the other condition individuals continued to work 
alone for thP remaining trials. Groups exhibited a conservative 
shift while individuals did not change. 
The present experiment was designed to provide a comparison 
of a diffusion of responsibility group condition with a concentra-
tion of responsibility group condition in a two-choice situation. The 
Wallach and Kogan diffusion of responsibility hypothesis leads to 
the prediction of a greater risky shift in the diffusion of respons-
ibility condition than in the concentration of responsibility condi-
tion. The diffusion of responsibility condition in the pres,ent exper-
iment is procedurally very similar to that of the Zajonc et al group 
condition. Consequently, a conservative shift would be expected on 
the basis of the results of the Zajonc et al study. 
Zajonc et al suggested that an important contributor to their 
2
Proceedings of the Iowa Academy of Science, Vol. 77 [1970], No. 1, Art. 44
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol77/iss1/44
310 IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE [Vol. 77 
findings may have been that in the group situation individuals 
placed value on making a correct prediction in addition to the 
value placed on the monetary payoffs. Since the conservative 
choice was correct more often than the risky choice, the conserva-
tive choice became preferred in the group situation. In order to 
focus on risk taking behavior as such, the rightness-wrongness fac-
tor was reduced in importance in the present experiment by using 
a situation where a payoff was given on every trial. 
.METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 144 undergraduates ( 72 male and 72 female) 
from introductory psychology who participated to fulfill a course 
requirement. The subjects participated in the experiment in groups 
of three same-sexed individuals. Within each of the three condi-
tions, 8 male and 8 female groups participated. Subjects were re-
quested not to sign up for the same session as a friend. 
Procedure 
The three subjects were seated in separate rooms which had 
oneway mirrors from which the E could observe the Ss. In each 
subject's room was a control box on which two push-buttons were 
located. A \'ertical panel rose behind the push-buttons, at the top 
of which was a green pilot light labelled "choose." '\Then the 
·'choose" light came on the subject was to select and press one of 
the two buttons. Below the ''choose" light was a digital display 
capable of indicating any one or two digit number. After the sub-
jects had responded the displav was illuminated for three seconds. 
During this time. the subjects recorded their payoffs on a sheet 
provided for this purpose. After three seconds the equipment reset, 
causing the display lights to go off and the "choose" lights to 
come on again. 
The subjects' payoffs depended on which button they pressed. 
One button (the risky choice) gave a payoff of either 15 points 
with a probability of .30 or of 4 points with a probability of . 70. 
The other button (the conservative choice) gave either a payoff of 
8 points with a probability of .65 or of 6 points with a probability 
of .35. For half the subjects in each condition, the right-handed 
button was the risky choice and the left-handed button the con-
servative choice, while the ren~rse was true for the remaining 
subjects. The probabilities of occurrence of the payoffs were con-
trolled by a tape reader. Three different tapes were prepared and 
one was randomly selected for each experimental session, subject 
to the constraint that each be used equally often in each condition. 
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The sequence of occurrence of the payoffs was random, except for 
the constraint that the probabilities be observed within each block 
of 20 trials. The stimulus events and subjects' responses were re-
corded on an 8-channel paper tape punch. 
Experimental Conditions 
All subjects were given 200 trials. For the first 100 trials, all 
subjects worked alone in their individual rooms. For the second 
100 trials, subjects served in one of the following three conditions: 
Responsibilit'y concentration condition. After the first 100 trials 
subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was over. 
Two subjects were led to the room of the third subject, where 
the remainder of the experiment was conducted for all three sub-
jects. Instructions were read in which it was stated that in the 
second part of the experiment one of the subjects was to make the 
decisions for the entire group. The decision maker was randomly 
chosen by drawing cards. To insure that the decisions were made 
only by the person selected, the other two people were told that 
they were not to communicate with the decision-maker in any way. 
A microphone was plugged in and the subjects were told that the 
session would be terminated if any communication occurred and 
that the E could monitor any violations of this restriction through 
the one-way mirror. In addition, the two non-decision making 
subjects were asked to position their chairs so that they could ob-
serve the payoffs. 
Responsibility diffusion condition. After the first 100 trials 
subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was over. 
The experimenter then led the subjects from two of the rooms to 
the third subject's room, where the remainder of the experiment 
was conducted for all three subjects. Instructions were read to the 
subjects by which they were informed that in the second part of 
the experiment the group was to arrive at a consensus choice for 
each decision. All group members were urged to participate in the 
making of the decisions. One person in each group was randomly 
selected to press the button chosen by the group for each decision. 
To make this condition comparable to the concentration condition, 
a microphone was plugged in and the subjects were told that the 
experimenter could observe them through a one-way mirror in 
order to observe the decision making process. 
Individu.al condition. After the first 100 trials subjects were 
told that the first part of the experiment was over. After a short 
pause, the Ss were given additional brief instructions and a new 
score sheet on which to record their payoffs. Subjects in this condi-
tion then continued to work alone in their individual rooms for 
the second 100 trials. This condition served as a control for changes 
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which might occur m·er time without changes m the !"xperimental 
conditions. 
RESULTS 
An 8 x 2 x 3 analysis of variance, with within factors of blocks 
of 25 trials and sessions and a between factor of conditions, was 
performed on the number of risky choices. Noni" of the main effects 
nor any of the interactions were significant at the .05 leveL The 
mean number of risky responses in the three conditions for the first 
100 and for the second 100 trials are shown in Table L 
An additional analysis employing t-tests was performed on the 
percentage shift scores. This analysis was performed to assess the 
possibility that a floor effect may have operated for some groups, 
thereby making a larger absolute conservative shift impossible. 
The results were the same as that of the above analysis of variance. 
Consequently, it appears that a floor effect did not play a signif-
icant role in the present experiment. 
In addition. there were no apparent differences in the behavior 
of males and females. 
TABLE I. MEAN PERCENTAGE OF R1sKY REsPo>: SES 1;-; THE FmsT A>:D 
.. 
SEC:O:'>D SESSIONS I>: EACH CONDITION. • 
Diffusion of responsibility 
Concentration of responsibility 
Control 
Mean 
DrscussroN 
First sess10n Second session 
41.58 
36.56 
35.43 
:'17.86 
41.00 
35.00 
33.93 
36.65 
The results of the present experiment do not support Kogan 
and Wallach's diffusion of responsibility hypothesis. No risky shift 
was found in a group condition with either a diffusion of respons-
ibility or a concentration of responsibility. In this respect, the 
present results are in agreement with Zajonc rt al, who also failed 
to obtain a risky shift in a two-choice situation. Thus a diffusion 
of responsibility hypothesis apparently cannot account for the 
behavior of groups in a two-choice situation with repeated trials. 
On the other hand, the results of the present experiment did 
not replicate the finding of a conservative shift in the Zajonc et al 
study. One factor is that in the Zajonc et al study there was an 
initial risky bias which did not occur in the present study. The 
initial risky bias probably facilitated the subsequent finding of a 
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conservative shift. The initial risky bias in the Zajonc et al exper-
iment was most likely elicited because subjects were informed that 
one choice, if correctly predicted, yielded 1 y2 cents and that the 
other choice, if correctly predicted, yidded 1 cent. It seems plaus-
ible that people should prefer the 1Y2 -cent choice to the 1-cent 
choice, at least until they learn that payoffs arc less likely with the 
1 Yz-cent choice. In the present experiment, no information was 
given about the potential payoffs available in the situation until 
the individual had sampled the choices. Thus no risky bias was 
present in the initial trials of the present experiment. 
The results of the present experiment are consistent with the 
Zajonc et al proposition that, in their experiment, the utility of 
making a correct prediction may have been more important in the 
group than in the individual condition. For the prediction task used 
by Zajonc et al one or the other choice was correct on every trial. 
By giving a payoff for each response, the rightness-wrongness 
dichotomy was lessened and without it no conservative shift oc-
curred. 
However, the procedural differences between the present study 
and the Za jonc et al study should not be over-emphasized. This is 
because in a recent paper by Zajonc and his students (Wolosin, 
Wolosin, and Zajonc, 1968) the conservative shift was not rep-
licated under conditions very similar to those of the earlier Zajonc 
Pt al ( 1968) experiment. Clearly, it is now necessary to try to 
specify the boundary conditions of the risky shift. One boundary 
condition may be that the phenomenon is found only with verbal 
materials like the Choice Dilemmas Qucstionaire. 
Finally it should be noted that in all of the two-choice exper-
iments discussed here individuals were not responding only to the 
expected value of the two choices. A clear preference for the con-
servative choice is uniformly present in all conditions of all exper-
iments. It may be that although people value riskiness and admire 
others who take risks, when faced with actually making choices for 
themsflves, people prefer a conservative to a risky choice. 
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